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This article considers critical accountants’ potential contribution to progressive reforms by
examining how trade unions transformed workplace accountability relationships and
developed social accounts as part of a workplace learning initiative. The article develops
and utilizes the concept of facilitative reforms to interpret the advances brought by
learning representative initiatives and accompanying changes in broader civil society,
workplace relationships and social accounts in the UK and New Zealand. The article ﬁnds
that the experience of the learning representative initiatives suggests that critical
accountants’ support of facilitative reforms may sometimes be a fruitful strategy.
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Humans have a multidimensional range of political, social and development needs, as well as economic ones (Marx,
1977). Unfortunately, current forms of work organization – which are legitimized by prevailing neoliberal thought that
reduces workers’ experience to self-interested individualistic ﬁnancial concerns (Harvey, 2005, p. 2) – downgrade
employees’ social and creative needs. Yet workers’ aspirations for development through shared experiences continue. One
response to such aspirations has been the pioneering of lay trade union (TU) ofﬁcials known as union learning
representatives in the UK (Hoque & Bacon, 2011;[191_TD$DIFF] Saundry, Hollinrake, & Antcliffe, 2010;[192_TD$DIFF]Wallis, Stuart, & Greenwood, 2005)
and learning representatives in New Zealand (Alkema &McDonald, 2014; Clough, 2008; Farr, 2008; Heathrose, 2011)1. These
ofﬁcials facilitate learning opportunities for their fellow employees, thus, distributing workplace learning opportunities
more equitably, allowing workers to develop new capabilities and resources to participate more fully in broader society
(Hoque & Bacon, 2011; Wallis et al., 2005 cf., McIlroy, 2008). TUs’ facilitation of learning to help realize workers’ personal
development aspirations suggest a tension with traditional ﬁnancial calculations that allocate learning according to
employers’ requirements..
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1987; [193_TD$DIFF] Cooper, Taylor, Smith, & Catchpowle, 2005). Current accounting techniques legitimize the prevailing authority
relations of managerial prerogative and represent labour simply as a cost to be reduced (Neu, Cooper, & Everett, 2001;[194_TD$DIFF] Sikka,
Wearing, & Nayek,1999;[195_TD$DIFF] Sikka, 2013). Such biases have prompted calls for critical accountants to infuse social accounts with
theory (Gray, 2002) and to use those accounts to enhance accountability (Gray, Brennan, & Malpas, 2014). Challenges to
conventional uses of accounting range: from development of social accounts that operationalize a speciﬁc theory to
articulate the interests of social movements (e.g., Cooper et al., 2005); through articulation of forms of Emancipatory
Accounting (Gallhofer & Haslam, 1997; [196_TD$DIFF] Gallhofer, Haslam, & Yownekura, 2015), the application of such accounts to
technological innovations (Gallhofer, Haslam, Monk, & Roberts, 2006; [197_TD$DIFF] Paisey & Paisey, 2006a), use of value-added categories
to distribute wealth more fairly (Sikka et al., 1999), Shadow or Silent accounts (Dey, Russell, & Thomson, 2011) and External
Reports (Thomson, Dey, & Russell, 2015) that delegitimize oppressive relationships; to the employment of conventional
accounts to realize progressive ends (e.g., Arnold & Hammond, 1994). Critical accountants have also made interventions in
civil society and political processes including working with politicians, meeting with regulators, mobilizing professional
bodies and fellow academics, reporting in the mass media and providing evidence to government enquiries to promote
reform of current practices (Cooper, Coulson, & Taylor, 2011; [198_TD$DIFF] Sikka & Willmott, 1997).
This article extends this literature by considering how critical accountants may contribute to workers’ development via
the illustration of a unique, longitudinal, internationally comparative study of learning representatives in UK and New
Zealand workplaces. It utilizes Gorz's (1968) work to develop the concept of facilitative reforms, both to interpret the
introduction of learning representatives and to consider critical accountants’ potential contribution to their success and to
other progressive changes. The article pursues its objectives by engaging with two themes in the accounting literature and
asks two research questions. The ﬁrst theme used is accountability (Cooper & Johnston, 2012;[199_TD$DIFF] Gray, Owen, & Adams, 1996;[200_TD$DIFF]
Stewart,1984) to ask the question of whether the ofﬁce of learning representatives has led to a sustainedmovement towards
democratic accountability in workplaces. The second theme used is that of social accounting in its various forms
(Bebbington, Brown, Frame, & Thomson, 2007;[201_TD$DIFF] Brown, 2009; Cooper et al., 2005; Dey et al., 2011; Gallhofer & Haslam,1997;
Gallhofer et al., 2015; Gray, 2002; Gray et al., 1996; Sikka et al., 1999; Thomson et al., 2015) to ask whether development of
social accounts associated with the learning representative initiative helped enhance accountability to realize the desired
learning objectives. In addressing these questions, the article also adds to the small body of work that links accounting to the
position of workers and their trade unions (see Arnold & Cooper, 1999; Berry et al., 1985; Cole & Cooper, 2006; Cooper, 1995;
Cooper & Essex, 1977; Ogden & Bougen, 1985; Neu et al., 2001, for others).
The discussion is organized as follows. The next section uses Gorz (1968) to articulate a framework of reformist,
revolutionary and facilitative reforms to understand civil society, workplace accountability and social accounting
dimensions of workplace initiatives. The following section details the emergence of the facilitative reform and associated
statutory and civil society changes of learning representative initiatives in the UK and New Zealand. The subsequent section
reports ﬁndings from the study of learning representatives at two organizations – one in the UK and one in New Zealand –
and the related changes to workplace accountability relationships and social accounts. The ﬁnal section concludes by
highlighting the importance of facilitative reforms to more radical change and suggests ways in which critical accountants
may support facilitative reforms.
2. Facilitative reforms, democratic accountability and social accounting: A review of the literature
Gorz (1968) provides a useful starting point for analysing change. He (Gorz, 1968, pp. 6–8) distinguishes between
revolutionary reforms and reformist reforms. Revolutionary reforms are “anti-capitalist”, seek “advance towards a radical
transformation of society” and require “structural change”. They base their possibility of attaining their objectives on
“implementation of fundamental political and economic changes”. By contrast, reformist reforms avoid changes that “are
incompatible with the preservation of the” current order and opt instead for ones that subordinate their “objectives to the
criteria of rationality and practicability of a given system and policy”. Gorz's purpose is to plot an alternative route to these
two types of change. He, thus, writes of “a not necessarily reformist reform” and “intermediate objectives”. Such reformswill
be “conceived . . . in terms of human needs” but not necessarily as part of a whole, future system; instead, they represent
“the general direction inwhich concrete solutions to speciﬁc problemsmove” (Gorz,1968, p.11). The term facilitative reform
will be used here to operationalize this concept alongside those of reformist and revolutionary reforms. To the extent that
learning representative initiatives allowed workers to pursue their own personal development aspirations, rather than
simply satisfying the needs of production, they should be considered as a facilitative reform per se.
Facilitative reforms will not be uniform. While they will all entail a change in the power relationship between dominant
and subordinate bodies, they can differ along a number of criteria. There are two that are relevant to the subsequent
discussion. First, there is the purpose of the change and the extent to which it is wholly in pursuit of the goals of the
subordinate party, or involves compromises that embrace the dominant group's interests2. Second, there is the extent to
which a change coalesces with complementary ones elsewhere to strengthen either a dominant or subordinate group2 This distinction is similar to Gorz's (1968, p.. [202_TD$DIFF] 9) categories of “autonomous power” of workers’ pursuit of their own interest and “subordinate power” of
workers’ acceptance of the primacy of capital's interest.
Please cite this article in press as: B. Lee, C. Cassell, Facilitative reforms, democratic accountability, social accounting and
learning representative initiatives, Crit Perspect Account (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2017.02.002
B. Lee, C. Cassell / Critical Perspectives on Accounting xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 3
G Model
YCPAC 1977 No. of Pages 14affected by the change. Reformist, revolutionary and facilitative reforms are not trichotomous categories. As Gorz indicates,
facilitative reformsmobilizeworkers and help them to see in the current order whatmay be achieved in an alternative order
based on human needs. Similarly, when different facilitative reforms coalesce to strengthen the subordinate group, there
may be potential for revolutionary reform by theorizing the means to move to an alternative economy.
These categories and variants of reformist, revolutionary and facilitative reformswill be used to develop a framework for
interpreting literature on broader changes, workplace accountability and social accounting before that framework is applied
to understanding emergence of learning representatives and an empirical study of their operation.
2.1. Workplace accountability
Formal accountability is an obligation “to provide an account . . . of those actions for which one is responsible” (Gray
et al., 1996, p. 38;[203_TD$DIFF] Gray et al., 2014, p. 266) and involves a possible sanction if responsibilities are not met (Stewart, 1984).
Accountability is relational (Joannides, 2012, p. 245) and underpinned by differences in power both within and outside
organizations. The most powerful people in commercial organizations in capitalist economies are those whose control of
capital assets allows deployment of “hierarchical accountability” (Roberts, 1991) tomake subordinate ofﬁce-holders explain
the execution of their role in pursuit of proﬁt. There is a danger that if presented as a universal panacea for addressing unjust
relationships, accountability becomes a vulgateword that “appears to be progressive but in practice . . . [takes] onmultiple
meanings such that it lacks political force” especially as those at an organization's apex will aim to immunize themselves
from criticism, so accountability is only effective when sought by those who enjoy great power (Cooper & Johnston, 2012,
p. 603). In acknowledging such dangers, this article argues for workplace democratic accountability. Democracy is
understood here as the right of everyone to participate in decisions that affect them. There are different ways to realize
participation (Gray et al., 1996). One way is by workers in subordinate positions choosing peer representatives – i.e., TU lay
ofﬁcials – to seek accountability from managers in organizations.
Gramsci's (1978) ideas help to understand how reformist, facilitative or revolutionary reforms in broader society could
affect movements to democratic accountability within workplaces. Gramsci's ideas are well-established in the accounting
literature ([204_TD$DIFF]Alawattage & Wickramasinghe, 2008; Arnold & Cooper, 1999; Arnold & Hammond, 1994; Cooper, 1995, 1997;
Dominelli & Hoogvelt, 1995; Goddard, 2002; Lee, [205_TD$DIFF] 010; Lee & Cassell, 2008; Lehman, 1995; Neu et al., 2001; Richardson,
1989; Spence, 2009). For economy, it may be stated that Gramsci saw thosewho owned and controlled capital and their allies
exercising hegemony over subordinate groups and classes. Hegemony involves organizing economic and social institutions
to solicit active consent from a majority and threaten coercion of any deviant minority. The capitalist state makes
compromises with different groups and classes to solicit consent by representing its actions as universally beneﬁcial
(Cooper, 1995, p. 179). In advanced capitalist economies, this may manifest in civil society institutions – such as churches,
community organizations and pressure groups – that allow subordinate groups to realize some aspirations even though they
are exploited economically. Gramsci identiﬁed two broad strategies for transforming capitalist economies. The ﬁrst is a “war
of manoeuvre”whereby subordinate classes seize control of the state and used it to transform the economy. By inference of
this revolutionary reform of the direction of the state, power relationships underpinning hierarchical accountability in
organizations could be transformed rapidly, possibly by a parallel revolutionary reform that creates workplace democratic
accountability.
Gramsci's second strategy of a “war of position” is more necessary in developed economies. It involves opponents of a
dominant class developing an alternative hegemony by projecting a vision of change in civil society institutions andwinning
support before seeking control of the state to transform the economy. Gramsci's idea of civil society provides a duality: Itmay
support the prevailing order; or, it may be used to promote change. In the former situation civil society institutions promote
reformist reforms. For example, professional associations of accountants have developed tools and techniques that embody
ideological assumptions supportive of a capitalist economy (Cooper, 1995; Goddard, 2002; Sikka et al., 1999). Right-wing
think-tanks have used civil society institutions to mobilize support for governments promoting economic elites’ interests
(Hall, 1979; Harvey, 2005; [206_TD$DIFF] Gray, Bebbington, & Collison, 2006). Neoliberal governments have devolved responsibilities for
their citizens’ welfare to a myriad of unaccountable, undemocratic, non-governmental organizations (Gray et al., 2006,
pp. 330 et seq.;[207_TD$DIFF] Harvey, 2005; Lavalette & Ferguson, 2007; Lehman, 2007; Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2006). Such reformist
reforms in civil society can have parallel developments in the workplace producing detrimental impacts on employees
(Paisey & Paisey, 2006b; Sikka, 2006). However, the relatively autonomous nature – i.e., without direct regulation by those
who control capital or the state – of many civil society institutions results in some opposing neoliberalism and the
exploitative practices of multinational companies (Lehman, 2007, p. 654;[208_TD$DIFF] Sinha, 2005, p. 163). A number of authors identify
how civil society institutions use different variants of social accounts (Spence, 2009; Thomson et al., 2015) or conventional
accounting reports (Arnold & Hammond, 1994) to promote progressive change. Others (Cooper & Essex, 1977; Sikka et al.,
1999) advocate accountants using concepts such as “value added” that are not tarnished by ideological connotations
associated with proﬁt and capitalist organization of the economy. By not advocating an agenda that supports capital, these
proposals promise facilitative reforms which, if adopted, could support parallel facilitative reforms in workplaces.
As indicated above, power residing in the workplace affects work relationships. Burawoy's ideas help illuminate any
potential for reformist, facilitative and revolutionary reforms of workplace relationships. Initially, Burawoy (1979, p. 110)
argued that modern corporations embodied an internal state which is “the set of institutions that organize, transform, or
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governance that allow workers to pursue some of their own interests within the terms and domain of the internal state.
Although Burawoy (1985, 2012) subsequently revises his analysis in various ways, his initial framework is used here. That
framework allows interpretation of literature that found the internal state in its different guises either induced consent
(Uddin, 2009, p. 786;[209_TD$DIFF] Uddin & Hopper, 2001, p. 647;[210_TD$DIFF] Uddin & Hopper, 2003) or imposed control (Ezzamel, Willmott, &
Worthington, 2004,[211_TD$DIFF] 2008) as instances where reformist reforms consolidated workplace hierarchical accountability. While
acknowledging that trade unions’ acceptance of the terms of a capitalist economy to negotiate on behalf of their members
may preclude their proposal of revolutionary reforms (Cooper, 1995, p. 189;[212_TD$DIFF] Ogden, 1982, p. 548), their role in expressing
workers’ opposition to their deprivations suggest TUs could propose facilitative reforms through the internal state to
promote increasing movement towards workplace democratic accountability. For example, TUs could seek workers’ greater
control over work activities, increased information about their employers’ business plans and the right to negotiate over
those plans (Ogden, 1982), or they could campaign for worker directors or other forms of representation in the upper
echelons of the organizations where they work (e.g., Batstone, Ferner, & Terry, 1983; [213_TD$DIFF] HMSO, 1977), with the potential to
exercise sanctions if employers do not comply.
2.2. Social accounting
Conventional ﬁnancial measurements dominate in commercial organizations and have been transferred to other sectors
through the advent of New Public Management (NPM) (Cooper & Johnston, 2012, pp. 604–605;[214_TD$DIFF] Gray et al., 2006,
pp. 333–334;[215_TD$DIFF] Lapsley, 2008). Although it is possible to use conventional accounts for progressive purposes (Arnold &
Hammond,1994), conventional ﬁnancial measurements are infusedwith ideological qualities that contribute to a prevailing
hegemony (Cooper, 1995). For example, Sikka et al. (1999) highlight how proﬁt is presented positively as a ﬁnancial category
to be increased while labour appears as a cost to be reduced.
Social accounts provide alternative forms of measurement to the ﬁnancial (Gray, 2002, p. 687;[216_TD$DIFF] Gray et al., 2014, p. 262).
Some perspectives on social accounting – such as advocates of the “business case” – propose reformist reforms by arguing
only for socially responsible policies if they bring “bottom line” ﬁnancial beneﬁts for those who control organizations by
reducing costs such as employee turnover, energy consumption and loss of reputation (Carroll & Shabana, 2010). Other
perspectives’ challenges to the authority of capital mean they are potentially facilitative reforms. For example, Gray et al.,
1996; [217_TD$DIFF] Gray et al. (1996; cf. Lehman, 1999) argue that powerful organizations’ accounts of their social and environmental
impact could provide other stakeholders with the information to lobby for change. Advocates of dialogic accounting
(Bebbington et al., 2007; [201_TD$DIFF] Brown, 2009, pp. 316–317; cf., Catchpowle & Smyth, 2016)3 propose encapsulating interests of
marginalized groups in accounts so although the interests of dominant groups that control capital are still expressed, the
fusion of interests could lead to both the powerful and the less powerful being transformed in some way. A range of tools
compatible with these perspectives have been suggested. These include: Emancipatory Accounting through which a full
range of interests are expressed to provide a vision of emancipatory reforms (Gallhofer &Haslam,1997; Gallhofer et al., 2006,
2015); Silent or Shadow Accounts that promote a dialogic exchange by using information in the public domain to raise
awareness of issues omitted by formal accounts, to encourage questioning of organizations (Dey et al., 2011); and External
Accounts that are prepared by external bodies and which may promote dialogic reasoning through polyvocal expression of
interests or counter accounts that articulate alternative views of an organization (Thomson et al., 2015). Sikka et al.’s (1999)
proposals for value added accounts may also be seen as facilitative reforms with some transformative potential as they
propose categories for changing understanding byallocating rewards according to the contributionmade by different parties
rather than simply to capital at the expense of labour. To this might be added what may be deﬁned as proactive alignment
reports that help legitimize an initiative of a subordinate group or class so that others may see the merits of that initiative
before it comes under attack by powerful forces. A perspective that suggests revolutionary reforms is Cooper et al.’s (2005)
proposals to exclude the dominant interests of capital by producing social accounts outside the inﬂuence of market
mechanisms and managers of organizations, linked to the struggles of social movements and informed by theory. Theory
may be used to project an alternative understanding of the totality of an initiative, to help mobilize social movements for
radical change by transforming their understanding.
2.3. Summary
Distinctions have been made between reformist, facilitative and revolutionary reforms in civil society, workplace
relationships and social accounts for the purpose of analysing learning representative initiatives.
3. Emergence of learning representative initiatives
The facilitative reform of learning representative initiatives in the UK and New Zealand and any accompanying statutory
and civil society changes will be considered in turn.3 See also Lehman's (1999) post-communitarian social accounting.
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Trade unions in the UK established strong, local collective bargaining traditions in many enterprises from the start of the
twentieth century and these have endured (Cooper & Essex, 1977, p. 207; [218_TD$DIFF]Ogden,1982, p. 557). Prima facie, there appeared to
be increasing facilitative reforms of industrial relations when the central confederation, the Trade Union Congress (TUC),
adopted a policy of advocatingworker directors between the 1960s and 1980s.Worker directors were also recommended by
themajority in the Government's Bullock Report (HMSO,1977) and experimentedwith in two nationalized industries to give
employees a role at the highest level of decision-making in industry (Batstone et al., 1983;[219_TD$DIFF] Ogden, 1982, p. 554). However,
such appointments were expected to act independently as directors rather than as trade union representatives and to keep
board information conﬁdential. Thus, the position of the vast majority of workers remained unchanged. Furthermore, the
reforms’ purpose of improving efﬁciency so that capitalism could be “saved”, gave primacy to capital's interests. Thus, these
policies and experiments embodied inherently reformist qualities. Not surprisingly, TUs continued to view local collective
bargaining as the primary mechanism to advance their members’ interests (Batstone et al., 1983, p. 124). Local collective
bargaining rights continue, although the election of the 1979–1997 neoliberal Conservative governments saw TUs as
impediments to the free functioning of markets and excluded them from public policy issues.
The facilitative reform of the Union Learning Representative (ULR) initiative took place when Labour governments won
Parliamentary majorities between 1997 and 2010. Although these governments worked generally within the conﬁnes of
neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005), they did sowith somemodiﬁcations (Sikka, 2006, p. 762). One early modiﬁcationwas support
for ULRs. The TUC (1998, p. 5) had developed proposals for “a high proﬁle role for [itself] . . . and trade unions as providers
and/or facilitators of vocational and other learning opportunities for members and potential members” and proposed a
network of ULRs at its national conference in 1998. This network emerged. The ULR project was signiﬁcant because of the
extent towhich it gave responsibility for organization of learning to workers and their representatives. Although the Labour
Government's policy document, The Learning Age (DfEE, 1998) advocated workplace learning being a partnership between
employers, workers and their trade unions, job-speciﬁc courses remained the obligation of the employer, but ULRs assumed
responsibility for other forms of learning. This capability to provide alternative learning opportunities was consolidated by
the introduction of a government-funded union learning fund (ULF). The Learning Age document had proposed the ULFwhich
grew from £2 million in 1999 to a peak of £20.2 million in 2012–2013 to support learning projects. Many individual TUs bid
for funds to introduce such learning projects. Receipt of government funds necessitated that the TUC and the recipient TUs
developed systems of accounting to measure learning opportunities, the uptake of those opportunities and their costs.
Although the requirement for accounting was derivative of NPM associated with neoliberalism, the accounts constituted
supportive facilitative reforms as they monitored the learning that ULRs had agreed with government agencies and
legitimized the role of ULRs ([220_TD$DIFF]Lee & Cassell, 2011).
In the early years of the scheme, however, many employers obstructed ULRs. In response, the Labour Government
introduced further facilitative reforms including statutory rights for ULRs through the 2002 revisions to the Employment Act
which allowed workers time off to train for – and conduct – the ULR role. The legislation also created a form of external
accountability in civil society as TUs could seek redress from employers who obstructed ULRs through the Arbitration,
Conciliation and Advisory Service (ACAS). Further facilitative reforms took place in civil society. The TUC4 established a
learning division – formerly TUC Learning Services and now Unionlearn. Unionlearn either commissioned or supported
publication of a range of what are described above as proactive alignment reports – see, for example, https://www.
unionlearn.org.uk/publications/research-paper-01-union-learning-union-recruitment-and-organising – that helped to
legitimize ULRs’ role. The number of ULRs grew considerably so over 30,000 have been trained.
Given the cumulative changes documented above, it is perhaps not surprising that long after Labour lost ofﬁce in 2010,
ULRs’ right to recourse to ACAS remained, ULF funding continued5 – see https://www.unionlearn.org.uk/publications/union-
learning-fund-prospectus-20152016 – and statutory rights for ULRs to organize learning endured.
3.2. New Zealand
In NewZealand, the Industrial Conciliation andArbitrationAct 1894 (NZ) introduced compulsory arrangements and led to
almost a century of centralized bargaining. Reformist reforms occurred from the nineteen-eighties when the then Labour
Government introduced the 1987 Labour Relations Act that made employment terms and conditions more susceptible to
local negotiations by reducing state intervention, although new bodies were instituted for collective representation of
workers at enterprise and industry levels (McAndrew, 2006, p. 245;[222_TD$DIFF] Vranken, 2000, p. 30). The subsequent National
Governments that held ofﬁce from 1990 to 1999 pursued an overtly neoliberal agenda. Thus, further reformist reforms
followed when they introduced the Employment Contracts Act 1991 which abolished the obligation of compulsory
arbitration and some mechanisms that permitted collectivism in the 1987 Labour Relations Act and instead prioritized4 Trade unions are interpreted here as both class organizations and active agents in civil society ([221_TD$DIFF]Gramsci,1978, pp. 56 & 221) and the TUC's actionsmay be
interpreted as acting in the latter capacity here.
5 The sum provided was reduced to £18.9 million in 2013–2014 and there was a change to where ULF was funded from a more “diverse range of funding
sources, reﬂecting supportive partnerships with many skills organisations” (Unionlearn, 2013, p. 9).
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when Labour-led Governments enjoyed ofﬁce between 1999 and 2008, a Mixed Method Proportional (MMP) system of
Parliamentary representationwas introduced in 1996. This has resulted in no government winning an overall Parliamentary
majority. Despite their weak position as a Parliamentary minority, the Labour-led coalition embarked on reformswith some
facilitative qualities by repealing the Employment Contracts Act and introducing the 2000 Employment Relations Act (ERA)
to promote registered trade unions’ negotiation of Collective Employment Agreements with employers. In addition to these
reforms that strengthened organized labour, the Labour-led coalition governments supported the introduction of learning
representatives.
The learning representative proposals were conceived initially by the national confederation, the New Zealand Council of
Trade Unions (NZCTU), based on their knowledge of the UK scheme (Farr, 2008). The proposals were articulated through a
reformulated tripartite body in civil society, Skill New Zealand (SNZ), which aimed to upskill the workforce. SNZ comprised
NZCTU, the employers’ body Business New Zealand (BNZ) and the Industrial Training Federation that represented the
Industrial Training Organizations (ITOs). ITOs oversaw vocational learning in different sectors. Although the scheme's
purpose of having learning representatives helpworkers deﬁne their own learning objectives constituted this as a facilitative
reform, the inclusion of BNZ meant that the scheme also focused on production needs, meaning that it contained some
reformist qualities. The scheme received support from the Labour-led Government's budget of 2004, when a total allocation
of NZ$1.12 millionwas provided – via the Tertiary Education Commission (TEC) – to fund a scoping exercise and then a pilot
project of learning representatives. Scoping of the scheme took place in the ﬁrst half of 2005 and the pilot programme ran
between July 2005 and June 2007 when the ﬁrst 100 learning representatives were trained (Farr, 2008). As part of this
scoping and piloting, NZCTU had to develop training and a qualiﬁcation for learning representatives and gain the support of
both employers and national trade union bodies at organizationswhere the schemewas to be introduced. During this period,
the learning representative initiative was installed at a number of worksites (Clough, 2010; Farr, 2008) and spread further as
the full project was rolled out (Alkema & McDonald, 2014; Heathrose, 2011). All government ﬁnancial support was given to
NZCTU and used to support their training of learning representatives. As in the UK, the obligation for NZCTU to report back to
the TEC on howmonieswere spent arose fromprior neoliberal NPM reforms. However, the outputs had been agreed between
NZCTU and a government agency, thus, the emergent systems of accounting also had a facilitative quality. The full scheme
was integrated into the New Zealand Skills Strategy and the NZCTUwas promised a marked increase in funding through a 4-
year allocation of NZ$766,000 per annum in the 2008 budget, partly to allow learning representatives to address literacy
needs that employees might not have been willing to admit to employers (Farr, 2008, p. 525).
A National Party-led coalition regained power at the end of 2008. They jettisoned the skills strategy which led to SNZ
becoming redundant with a concomitant reduction in the legitimacy of learning representatives. The grant to NZCTU was
also reduced to NZ$300,000 per annum from 2009 (Heathrose, 2011, p. 14) to focus on literacy and numeracy. NZCTU and an
ITO did, however, commission evaluations of the learning representative scheme (Alkema & McDonald, 2014; Heathrose,
2011), to provide proactive alignment reports to help sustain legitimacy for the initiative.
3.3. Overview
In the UK and New Zealand, learning representative initiatives that were facilitative reforms per se, coalesced with other
facilitative reforms of civil society institutions, production of proactive alignment reports and TUs’ accounting for public
funds received. ULRs in the UK focused more exclusively on workers’ interests and so constituted a greater measure of a
facilitative reform – and enjoyed enduring, stronger legislative support – than was the case in New Zealand. The impact of
this pattern of developments on accountability relationships and social accounting at the case study organizations is
considered next.
4. Empirical research
This section investigates whether the facilitative reforms of learning representative initiatives led to democratic
accountability and associated forms of social accounting at two organizations; one in the UK and the other in New Zealand6.
Cases where learning representatives were active – at least initially – were selected purposefully because they were
information-rich (Patton, 2002, p. 243) and allowed consideration of the research questions. Fieldwork in the UK ﬁrst took
place between 2006 and 2008 when regular visits were made to the case study site and other relevant organizations.
Fieldwork in New Zealand ﬁrst took place during February–March 2008 after the learning representative pilot project was
completed. A second period of ﬁeldwork took place in New Zealand in April 2012 when the scheme had been operational for
4 years but more than 3 years after the Labour-led coalition lost power. Further interviews were conducted at the UK site up6 The cases are a public sector organization in the UK and a third sector organization in New Zealand. While less proﬁt-focused than some organizations,
they are suitable for our purposes as they are subjected to similar ﬁnancial pressures and take on many of the characteristics of capitalist organizations.
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Table 1
Summary of respondents.
Respondent UK New Zealand
Number of respondents Number of interviews Number of respondents Number of interviews
Trade union confederation 1 1 6 7
Funding body 1 1 4 4
Government Department 2 2
National training federation 4 4
Regional learning support organization 3 3
National TU ofﬁcial 1 2 4 5
Regional TU ofﬁcial 2 4
Local learning convenor 2 6
ULR 9 9 5 5
Learner 5 5
Learning-related manager 1 1 1 1
Learning provider 1 1
National training organization 4 4
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over time both within and between each case study.
In both countries, interviews were held with trade union confederation ofﬁcials, regulators or providers of learning, full-
time ofﬁcials of participating trade unions, learning representatives, managers who negotiated provision of learning
opportunities at the organizations and – in the UK – learners. Holding interviews with respondents in corresponding
positions in both countries allowedmeaningful comparisons. In the UK, 33 interviews were held with 26 respondents while
32 interviews were held with 30 respondents in New Zealand. A summary of the position of each respondent is provided in
Table 1. Interview schedules varied according to an interviewee's position and country of residence and the point in the
development of the scheme when the interview took place. Common themes discussed with each respondent were their
understanding of the scheme, the types of learning delivered, successes and difﬁculties experienced, ways of calculating
learning needs and measuring progress and successes of the scheme, formal agreements in support of learning
representatives, mechanisms for seeking redress if learning was obstructed and any experience of such obstructions and
redress. Interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. Relevant documents were collected from a range of
sources including the organizations visited and the Parliamentary library in New Zealand. Delivery of learning opportunities
was observed in the UK and ongoing e-mail conversations were held with respondents throughout the study.
Written data – i.e., documents and interview transcripts – were analysed using a template (King, 2012). Headings in the
template enabled understanding of any facilitative qualities of the learning representative reforms and included: prior forms
and mechanisms of accountability and those emergent with the learning representative initiatives; measurements of
workplace learning; howany conﬂicts between the criteria informing the learning representative initiative and others at the
case organizationwere resolved; and the impact that changes in government had. There is a danger in longitudinal research
that a teleological argument will be provided at the end of the study, with a latter period appearing as a natural outcome of
an earlier period. To avoid this, template analysis was conducted, ﬁrst in 2009, after the initial period of research was
completed when ﬁndings were written up. Template analysis was conducted subsequently on the data collected from 2012
to 2013 and that data was written up and compared with the ﬁndings from the earlier period. Ideas and patterns that
emerged from the respective periods were veriﬁed against observations, ﬁeld notes, and e-mail correspondence with
respondents.
Findings from each case are discussed in turn by providing background information and details of initial changes and
subsequent developments.
4.1. The UK case
4.1.1. Background
This large site of a civil service department employs 5000 people. Historically, learning opportunities were allocated
within a hierarchical system of accountability by workers making applications for learning opportunities to a line manager
through an annual performance-evaluation and development scheme. Traditional ﬁnancial criteria guided decisions so
learning was only offered if costs were offset by “a return on the investment for the beneﬁt of the business” (Learning and
Development (L&D) manager) by a learner taking on greater responsibility.7 We also conducted earlier ﬁeldwork in the UK from2002, after the Employment Actwas revised to give learning representatives legal rights and in New
Zealand in the early months of 2005 when the learning representative project was being conceived. While understanding from that research informs this
study, those data are not analysed here as they were not designed as part of this enquiry.
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As elsewhere (Clough, 2010; Saundry et al., 2010; Stuart, 2011; Wallis, 2008), accountability relationship reforms were
articulated through a learning agreement, signed in this case by the national TU and the executive management of the civil
service department. The agreement speciﬁed the number of ULRs permitted at sites and the time allowed for the ULR role
which was up to 70% of theworking week. The agreement led to establishment of a local steering committee comprising the
lead ULR or learning convenor, a site management representative and learning providers. A physical ofﬁce space was
negotiated, fromwhich ULRs could organize learning. Did such changes constitute a facilitative reform by moving towards
democratic accountability in decisions about access to learning? Introduction of ULRs created conﬂicts with the output
targets of juniormanagerswhose superordinate positionwas embedded in the formal hierarchy. The learning convenor said:
“[T]he biggest problem we’re having now is team leaders and junior managers who obviously see targets and business
[output] needs above everything else.” Another ULR commented:
I think employers need to recognise that if you’ve got a union [learning] rep there, that member of staff may be needed to
be [discounted] on targets. Because our targets are done on head count so I’m there in the head count but I’m not doing
any work for them whilst I’m doing my union duties.
This opposition was overcome by assimilating ULRs into the local TU branch so extant negotiating procedures could be
used to raise objections to managers’ obstructions of ULRs’ role, thus, bringing a facilitative reform to what Burawoy
described as the internal state.
4.1.3. Development of new accounting measurements
Traditional ﬁnancial measurements that dominated formal decisions about access to learning discriminated against
ordinary workers. The L&D manager reported:
[Ordinary grades] can still apply and be funded for learning opportunities – yeah – if they can show it's a direct beneﬁt to
themselves and the business in the job they’re currently doing. . . . But some of the academic degree courses, etcetera,
would be geared at [people at] a much higher level.
By contrast, workerswanted to pursue learning for non-ﬁnancial purposes. Somewanted learning “to seewhether the old
grey matter's still working”, or “for own personal satisfaction” or “to actually better myself” (learners). Others wanted to
learn a new skill, such as a language, for non-work areas of their lives. Different learners said:
I just ﬁnished . . . a beginner's course in Greek. It's for when I intend to retire to Greece. I’ve got a lot of friends out there.
The Spanish I just took because that's where I go on holiday every year, to like Majorca.
Still others wanted the capability to help and understandmore. One learner explained how she had learnt a sign language
to assist deaf people:
I’ve come across them in the past and not been able to communicate with them for whatever reason apart fromwriting
things on paper and I felt that if I did the course I’d have a greater understanding of their needs.
To help realize workers’ learning needs, ULRs conducted a learning needs analysis – i.e., an organization-wide account of
learning aspirations – and used that information for planning, costing and reporting purposes. When planning, the TU used
the information to identify and arrange different types of learning. Some courses, such as photography or keep ﬁt classes,
were provided free in-house by TUmembers sharing their non-vocational skills. Other provisions – including some delivered
at the site but sourced from a local college – ranged from basic skills such as literacy and numeracy, through courses that
developed workers’ knowledge and skills inways not related to their current occupation, to higher education qualiﬁcations.
When costing, ULRs gathered information about government subsidies through Skills for Life that paid the full costs of basic
skills and Train to Gain for career-based learning, before directingworkers to providers.When costing the remaining courses,
ULRs identiﬁed how many of their members wanted to take a course and liaised with the provider to discuss the cost of
delivering the learning before calculating charges for learners. Some of the information on courses organized was also used
to report back to the ULF administrators – via full-time TU ofﬁcials – on the attainment of learning targets for which
government funds had been received.
Effectively, ULRs instituted a facilitative reform that realized some of the objectives advocated in Sikka et al. [224_TD$DIFF]’s (1999) call
for value added accounts as some of the value created in the organization was diverted back to workers by ULRs using the
organization's premises for learning purposes. The accounts may also be considered dialogical (Bebbington et al., 2007;
Brown, 2009) as they aligned workers’ desire for learning with the government's support for TUs to extend workplace
learning opportunities, the TU's obligations to report back on their use of government funds and its desire to extend
opportunities to its members beyond those funded by government. Signiﬁcantly, although not informed by theory, the
accounts gaveworkers an insight into a non-capitalist right of developing in theworkplace inways expressive of their own –
rather than production's – needs.
4.1.4. Struggles over the new systems of accountability
After a change in government, the organization's senior managers reduced the time for ULRs to perform their role to a
maximum of 20% of their working week. While this reduction made it difﬁcult for ULRs to meet regularly to plan new
learning opportunities, it was sufﬁcient for ULRs to staff the ofﬁce throughout the normal dayshifts to provide advice aboutPlease cite this article in press as: B. Lee, C. Cassell, Facilitative reforms, democratic accountability, social accounting and
learning representative initiatives, Crit Perspect Account (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2017.02.002
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using their more limited time for TU duties, extant rights of redress could be utilized, so beneﬁts of the earlier facilitative
reform endured as some learning remained deﬁned by workers.
4.1.5. Struggles over the new forms of accounting
The change in government was followed by new challenges to the ways in which ULRs used social accounts for planning
and costing activities. The organization's senior management advised ULRs that, apart from Skills for Life, state funding for
vocational skills, such as through Train to Gain, was closed because the Government had providedmonies to the civil service
department for investment in learning, even if these funds never ﬁltered down to ordinary workers. ULRs’ right to purchase
learning funded by a small charge made to the learner, was also challenged by being interpreted as contravening the
organization's “procurement rules” governing “trading on ofﬁcial premises”. A ULR said:
[W]e have been trained to do this and to negotiate with these providers. We’re the ones who have been interviewing the
providers and ﬁnding the best ones for the job but because we’re not falling into the ofﬁcial procurement policy they’re
saying we can’t do that anymore.
ULRs continued to organize other courses free in-house through sharing of TU members’ skills. Although one ULR
suggested that management's actions were restricting learning to activities such as dance that ﬁtted in “withmanagement's
Health and Wellbeing [agenda]”, the accounts continued as a dialogical expression of the trade union's desire to provide
learning, workers’ aspirations for development and continued realization of broader learning goals that involved
redistribution of value to ordinary workers. In this regard, they continued as a facilitative reform by assisting organization of
learning under workers’ control.
Of course, the employers’ actions necessitated a partial retreat from the initial ULR advance, but the ULRs’ accounts of
previous activities enabled them to articulate the extent of lost opportunities with the option of agitating for the right to
continue to organize some of those opportunities. Although continued government funding and success of the ULR initiative
elsewhere may have precluded either the national TU and Unionlearn from commissioning the types of External Reports
described by Thomson et al. (2015) to document the impact of the changes, the local trade union could provide numerous
stories of how workers’ lives had been transformed by the learning undertaken previously and how public money for
development was skewed towards those in positions closest to the apex of the organization, accentuating existing
inequalities. Indeed, although not written up formally, ULRs offered what was akin to verbal partisan Shadow Accounts (Dey
et al., 2011) that contested any ofﬁcial account of learning provisions.
4.2. The New Zealand case
4.2.1. Background
This organization provides services to people with intellectual disabilities; many of whom reside in small community-
based care homes. Many of the organization's 6500 employees work in homes with few other employees. Historically, these
care-workers pursued a level 4 qualiﬁcation in the New Zealand National Qualiﬁcations Authority's National Qualiﬁcations
Framework (NZQA, 2005). However, even though this included much on-the-job training, many workers failed to complete
the qualiﬁcation. The resulting qualiﬁcations-deﬁcit created “a problem [for the employer] with pressure from funders to
actually comply with quality standards which requires people with skills and competencies” (TU national ofﬁcial). There
were also ﬁnancial implications for care-workers whose remuneration was linked to their qualiﬁcations. The ITO in the
sector developed level 2 and 3 qualiﬁcations that this employer envisaged providing a stairway from their own staff
induction provisions to level 4 qualiﬁcations.
4.2.2. Development of new systems of accountability
Reﬂecting the fusion of a facilitative reform of learning representatives helping their members realize their own
objectives and the more reformist concern of the organization requiring more highly-skilled people to provide the service,
the employer hoped learning representatives would direct their fellow workers to the new intermediate vocational
qualiﬁcations. Consistent with the prevailing industrial relations context, the national trade union had Collective
Employment Agreements with a number of employers. Changes to workplace relations were agreed by the Chief Executive
Ofﬁcer of this organization and the TU's national leadership negotiating the following addition to the Collective Employment
Agreement:
In order to facilitate a culture of training and development the employer shall recognise employee elected learning
representatives, whose role will be to support and advocate for employees who have registered as trainees for NZQA
approved qualiﬁcations.
Over 150 TU members from this organization then undertook the NZCTU's learning representative training. However,
managers of care homes, who had previously organized learning – and who were not involved with negotiations with trade
unions – contested the reform by refusing to recognize learning representatives.
To abate the opposition, the national Human Resource (HR) manager proposed three documents to give learning
representatives recognition within the homes. The ﬁrst covered the role of learning representatives and reﬂected thePlease cite this article in press as: B. Lee, C. Cassell, Facilitative reforms, democratic accountability, social accounting and
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their role including provisions for meetings with the ITO and representatives of the organization's Centre for Learning (CfL).
Although proposed by management, the ﬁrst two documents were based on examples circulated by NZCTU. The third was
potentially more contentious as it sought to inﬂuence the TU's procedures of selection. The HR manager said:
[W]e’re putting it to the union that we don’t mind them sort of coming upwith learning reps and training them, however
we want some standards in amongst this. We don’t just want it to be a popularity election; we actually want the right
people for the job otherwise we don’t actually see it getting anywhere.
Nevertheless, the TU accepted all three documents. Despite the New Zealand scheme's introduction into a context
historically bereft of local negotiations and lacking statutory support, the framework provided a type of facilitative reform
that restructured what Burawoy describes as the internal state. Although this reform expressed management's desire to
inﬂuencewho became learning representatives, it provided somemovement towards democratic accountability by allowing
learning representatives to bring care home managers to account should the latter obstruct them.
4.2.3. Development of new systems of accounting
As government funding for the learning representative project was deployed by NZCTU, individual TUs had no obligation
to show how government funds were used. However, some TUs invested their own funds. The TU in this case conducted an
informal cost-beneﬁt analysis of the learning representative scheme. The TU's national leader explained: “We’re willing to
put a lot ofmoney into this [because of] . . . lowpay, butwewant to be assured that there's a skill [agenda] that goeswith it.”
In effect, learning representatives could help counter low pay by upskilling the TU's membership. The TU also developed
social accounts around learning. Learning representatives mapped out the progressive levels of knowledge and competence
required for the new Levels 2 and 3 qualiﬁcations and the Level 4 qualiﬁcation. The employer advised learning
representatives which workers had not progressed to the Level 4 qualiﬁcation. Learning representatives then contacted the
workers to map out an account of the sum of credits that each had against the Level 2 and Level 3 qualiﬁcations and the
deﬁcit against the Level 4 qualiﬁcation. A national TU ofﬁcial explained that the objective was to “see how far they [i.e.,
learners]'ve got with that Level 4 to see if we can cross-credit to the Level 2. Because if we can get them through so that
they’ve got a certiﬁcate for Level 2, thenwe can maybe coax them onto that Level 3 and then they may eventually get to the
Level 4”.
As workers’ remuneration could be increased, these accounts displayed similar qualities to the value added accounting
advocated by Sikka et al. (1999). The accounts could also be described as dialogic (Bebbington et al., 2007; Brown, 2009)
embracing learners’ desires for vocational qualiﬁcations, the TU's objective of encouraging learning to counter low pay and
the employer's desire to upskill the workforce. Although relatively weak because of the trade union's dependence on the
employer for information, development of these accounts may be considered as a facilitative reform as they expressed care-
workers’ interests and helped transform their self-perceptions as individuals capable of gaining higher level qualiﬁcations
expressive of career development.
4.2.4. Struggles over new systems of accountability
After the new National Party-led coalition government was elected in 2008, some employers became less supportive of
learning representatives. At the case study organization, the initial impact was insidious. When care home managers
resigned, their replacements often challenged learning representatives’ rights to organize learning. The TU's ability to seek
redress for such actions within the organizationwas affected by a long drawn-out dispute over remuneration for sleepovers
at the homes. This dispute culminated in legal action and “caused a little bit of an argy bargy between unions, members, non-
members in the organization [which] . . . didn’t help our learning reps” (national TU ofﬁcial). It also contributed to the
employers ignoring the three documents supporting learning representatives that were agreed previously. These actions
removed learning representatives’ recourse to senior management to seek redress when junior managers obstructed their
role. The enduring clause in the Collective Employment Agreement expressing the right of learning representatives to exist
was the only remnant of the earlier facilitative reform and movement towards democratic accountability at many of this
organization's care homes, although learning representatives endured at other employers.
4.2.5. Struggles over the new systems of accounting
The National Party-led coalition government's austerity package of cuts included “$300millionworth of saving [from the
TEC budget]” and loss of “the appropriation that funded the learning reps” (TEC senior civil servant) which meant that there
remained no obligation for individual trade unions to develop accounts to report back to government. The change in political
climate led the TU in this case to reﬂect less positively on the beneﬁts of replacing learning representatives. A national TU
ofﬁcial explained:
[W]e’d got little pockets where we needed to retrain new learning reps, and that's quite hard to do ﬁnancially when
there's only, say, one or two here [on the North Island] and another one or two in the other island. The cost to get them
places and then there was an argument over who was going to pay [ [225_TD$DIFF]i.e., the trade union or NZCTU].Please cite this article in press as: B. Lee, C. Cassell, Facilitative reforms, democratic accountability, social accounting and
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agreements was accompanied by a refusal to provide information for the workplace social accounts. A TU national ofﬁcial
reported:
Juliet Ograne [pseudonym] . . . said: “No!My staff [will monitor learning attainment].”Her staff had had years to bloody
well do it but theminute she could see that somebody elsewas going to . . . get kudos around learningwhen shewas the
head of Centre for Learning, it was like “get stuffed”.
As learning representatives were unable to identify people who had not completed their vocational qualiﬁcations, the
accounts that they constructed fell out of use. Consequently, the initial facilitative reform of accounting for learning at this
organization was lost.
The national trade union knew examples of learning representatives’ previous achievements at this organization. As in
the UK, the trade union articulated informal verbal Shadow Account (Dey et al., 2011) about how some care-workers were
not being given full opportunities for developmentwhich could have affected the quality of care provided. The national trade
union and NZCTU also had information about successes at other organizations where learning representatives continued to
operate which could have been used – along with the ﬁndings reported in the proactive alignment reports commissioned by
an ITO and NZCTU (Alkema &McDonald, 2014; Heathrose, 2011) – to compile External Reports (Thomson et al., 2015) about
this organization to demonstrate the beneﬁts brought by learning representatives, to seek to inﬂuence government and
purchasers of care services to pressure the employer to change its stance. However, the national trade unionwas engaged in
other ways of raising the remuneration of their members and the learning representative initiative had been pioneered by
the national confederation, NZCTU. NZCTU was using government ﬁnance to promote the facilitative reform of learning
representatives elsewhere to address basic literacy and numeracy issues.
5. Discussion and conclusion
People's development at work has been seen as a worthwhile right per se. Learning representative initiatives that
facilitate people's development in the workplace have been analysed using Gorz (1968). Gorz's categories of reformist and
revolutionary reforms have been supplemented by the classiﬁcation of facilitative reforms that are based on human need
and disaggregated bywhether labour asserts its own purpose or compromises with capital and the extent towhich a reform
coalesces with complementary reforms elsewhere to strengthen either a dominant or subordinate group. This classiﬁcation
has been used to consider two research questions affecting learning representatives in the UK and New Zealand and the
types of contribution that critical accountantsmaymake to support such changes. The ﬁrst research question askedwhether
introduction of learning representatives led to amovement towards democratic accountability inworkplaces. Gramsci's idea
of civil society and Burawoy's notion of the internal state were used to understand how facilitative reforms could moderate
differential power relationships in workplaces. The ﬁndings indicate that in the context of supportive government actions
and facilitative reforms in civil society, that weremore evident in the UK than in New Zealand, an alliance of trade unions and
senior management in organizations led to facilitative reforms of internal states that supported learning representatives’
organization of learning for their members and a capacity to seek redress when obstructed by junior managers. Thus, in
answer to this ﬁrst research question, the answer is yes, initially. Higher managers’ support of learning representative
initiatives negated any need to hold them to account which might have inferred movement towards revolutionary reforms.
Less sympathetic governments were then elected in both countries. The respective industrial relations traditions and the
extent towhich facilitative reforms in the workplace had coalesced with facilitative reforms elsewhere, affected subsequent
developments. In New Zealand, neoliberal policies, abandonment of a national skills strategy and weakening of SNZ in civil
society were followed by the employer withdrawing from the alliance with the TU and retreating to the historical
arrangement of minimal local negotiations. Instead, senior managers supported junior managers’ disregard for learning
representatives. By contrast, in the UK, changes to civil society were embedded in long-standing, local negotiating
arrangements which endured, as did statutory rights of learning representatives, evenwhen a less sympathetic government
was elected. Thus, although seniormanagers at the case study organization reduced the hours for the learning representative
role, learning representatives could still challenge juniormanagers who obstructed their organization of some learning. This
leads to the ﬁrst important contribution of this article. If the discourse of accountability is to realize its emancipatory
potential, rather than becoming an unhelpful, vulgate term (Cooper & Johnston, 2012), changes in accountability
relationships have to be assessed in a speciﬁc setting with progressive and regressive variants – e.g., by hierarchical
accountability and the facilitative reform of workplace democratic accountability in this instance.
The second research question was whether development of social accounts associated with the learning representative
initiative helped realize movements towards democratic accountability and desired learning outcomes. Provision of
government funding to support learning representatives in both countries led to either TU confederations or national trade
unions developing social accounts to measure learning outcomes against government expenditure. Although the need for
these accounts arose from neoliberal reforms embodied in NPM, their purpose was to support learning representative
initiatives, so they constituted a complementary facilitative reform. Additionally, the TUC in the UK supported the
preparation of what have been deﬁned as proactive alignment reports that helped to legitimize the activities of ULRs in
workplaces. Learning representatives’ development of accounts inworkplaces to measure skills deﬁcits in New Zealand and
workers’ desires for learning in the UK embodied some of the qualities of value added accounts advocated by Sikka et al.Please cite this article in press as: B. Lee, C. Cassell, Facilitative reforms, democratic accountability, social accounting and
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encapsulating the dialogical qualities proposed by others (Bebbington et al., 2007; Brown, 2009). At the outset, in both
countries, these accounts permitted learning representatives’ facilitation of learning and a capacity to highlight any junior
managers’ obstructive behaviour when it was necessary to bring them to account. Thus, in answer to the second research
question of whether the social accounts marked a progressive facilitative reform that helped realize a movement towards
democratic accountability and the desired learning outcomes; again, the answer is yes, initially.
When different governments were elected, there were some regressive changes in New Zealand. Although the accounts
compiled by NZCTU endured and both an ITO and NZCTU (Alkema & McDonald, 2014; Heathrose, 2011) commissioned
proactive alignment reports that helped legitimize the schememore broadly and protect its continuation elsewhere in New
Zealand, the accounts composed by learning representatives at the case study organization disappeared because
management refused to provide information on which the accounts were based. This suggests that some perspectives on
social accounting give insufﬁcient weight to variations in political strength of different parties when social accounts – even
those with dialogical qualities – are composed. In the UK case, workplace social accounts retained their dialogical character.
Not only did the civil society institution of TUC Unionlearn continue to commission and support proactive alignment reports
that helped to legitimize the ULR initiativemore generally, but theworkplace accounts were produced independently by the
trade union. Both the disappearance of social accounts that were not produced independently by the TU in New Zealand and
the endurance of social accounts that were developed independently by a trade union in the UK provides support for Cooper
et al.’s (2005) criterion for critical social accounts to be produced outside of the inﬂuence of markets and management of
organizations. However, although social accounts constituted progress in speciﬁc historical and cultural contexts, they were
not informed by the theory advocated by Cooper et al. This leads to the second important contribution of this article which
has been to locate extant social accounts – along with the learning representative initiatives and changes to accountability
provisions – in a framework of reformist, facilitative and revolutionary reforms to assess when they promoted progress that
could lead eventually to radical change.
It is now appropriate to address the issue of critical accountants’ contribution to progressive reforms such as learning
representative initiatives. Critical accountants have a commendable history of intervention when powerful bodies have
taken regressive actions (e.g., Berry et al., 1985; Cooper et al., 2005; Sikka & Willmott, 1997). Sometimes, progress may
involve infusing accounts with theory to help bring about a fundamental change in oppressed parties’ understanding
(Cooper et al., 2005), thus, promoting what Gorz (1968) described as a revolutionary reform. However, the initial
advancement and some endurance of learning representative schemes drew support from varieties of social accounts that
were not infused with theory, indicating that advancement is not manifest only in transition to a non-exploitative and
sustainable economy, but also by strengthening the position of those who could beneﬁt from such an economy within the
conﬁnes of the current system.
In building on Gorz's deﬁnitions of reformist reforms that protect the current order and revolutionary reforms that
precipitate change to a new order, to articulate a clear concept of facilitative reforms based on human needs that provide a
glimpse of a future order and by adding the criteria of strength and purpose, the article provides a framework for another
strategy. Critical accountants need to bewatchful to ensure that their actions do not help perpetuate a prevailing hegemony,
but one strategy for change could be support of facilitative reforms that extend rights of oppressed groups such as through
the learning representative initiatives. Critical accountants’ contributions could involve volunteering proactive alignment
reports to help legitimize progressive facilitative reforms. In the example of learning representative schemes, these reports
provide material for advocates of such schemes in other countries. They can also help trade union ofﬁcials negotiate with
employers by providing guidance about how success was achieved elsewhere. Additionally, knowledge gleaned from
research and preparation of those reports may be used to advise a social movement on how they could transform
accountability relationships in their spheres of inﬂuence. For example, the comparative nature of this research has allowed
observation that – in line with their different industrial relations traditions – sustaining a learning representative initiative
with local representationwas easier in the UK than it was in New Zealand, indicating a need for New Zealand trade unions to
include rights to information in Collective Employment Agreements, to promote the sustainability of learning
representatives in particular locations. Realization of new facilitative reforms and protection of existing ones could
provide oppressed groups with insights of an alternative order and help strengthen social movements so that, subsequently,
they become more receptive to – and are able to mobilize more effectively in support of – theory-informed social accounts
and the revolutionary reforms that they imply.
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